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The Objective this empirical research is conducted with the main purpose 
to assess whether the short-run underpricing level of IPOs on privatization 
is lower or not compared to the privately owned enterprises in Indonesia. 
The aim is intended to identify whether the presence of excessive 
underpricing is occurred among the Privatization IPOs in Indonesia. 
Method are used to fullfil the objective, the samples are derived from both 
SOEs and Non-SOEs that conducted the Initial Public Offerings (IPO) 
during period 2000-2009. The total final samples used are 147 samples. 
Moreover, this research focuses on the initial return of the first trading day 
to determine the underpricing level. The data is also analyzed by using 
descriptive statistics, Kolmogorov Smirnov test, parametric tests, Non-
parametric tests and Multiple Regression Analysis. 
Result of the research shows the evidence that the extent of underpricing is 
significantly lower in IPOs conducted by the SOEs compared to the 
privately owned in Indonesia. Furthermore, the result also clarifies that 
there is no occurrence of excessive underpricing within the Privatization 
IPOs in Indonesia.  
Conclusion is the degree of underpricing within the SOEs is proven to be 
lower than the Non-SOEs. This fact is supported by the reasons of tight 
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standardize legislation, underwriter’s reputation, budget deficit in 
Indonesia, and well-established industry within the SOEs. 
 
Keywords: Privatization, Underpricing, Initial Public Offering (IPO), 





Existence of IPO around the world within the business community was 
mainly dominated by privately owned enterprises. However, as the time 
goes by, this state has caught the attention of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) to also engage with go public issues In Indonesia itself, there were 
several evidences associated with privatized SOEs. However, a 
comprehensive privatization program of SOEs was clearly commenced in 
the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. Correspondingly, Irianto 
(2004) mentioned that crisis and international pressure, budget deficit as 
well as poor SOEs performance have primarily driven the government in 
doing the privatizations to deal with the severe crisis.  
 
Regardless the terms of carrying out IPOs, there is usually an anomaly 
trend that is most likely to happen, known as the underpricing 
phenomenon. Numerous literatures and research also have been showing 
that the average of initial public offering (IPOs) are inclined to be 
underpriced (Alexakis, 2007). He also added that short run underpricing 
phenomenon occurred at the end of first day of trading as the difference 
between offering price of a stock and its market price. It is also known as 
first day return or initial return. According to Loughran, Ritter and 
Rydqvist (1994), all 25 countries with accessible statistical data are 
encountered underpricing in the short run. The underpricing itself is 
mainly observed using one-day initial return but some exceptions where 
price movements are restricted or trading does not commence promptly, 
period of weeks or months elapses between the offering day and the 
market price is used.   
 
Furthermore, the underpricing phenomenon is not only occurred around 
privately-owned enterprises but it also taken place within the privatization 
form. An auxiliary proposition has arisen on this implication of 
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underpricing, as various objectives have exceeded the primary advantage 
on the sales price of the current IPO and drive some government to more 
likely underprice its privatization offerings. The latest issue on 
underpriced privatization IPOs has even emerged in Indonesia during 
early November 2010. The information given by Megawati (2010), 
involved Krakatau Steel as the largest integrated steel producer in 
Southeast Asia. This underpricing case is still under investigation of 
Indonesia’s House of Representatives due to the possibility of 
irregularities conspiracy in cheap shares pricing at 850 rupiah ($0.09) per 
share during the IPO.  
Seeing that the extent of IPO has been covering both privately and state-
owned enterprises, thus many possibilities have arisen from the action that 
has been made by these major participants of the IPOs. One of the 
significant question marks that left behind within business society is 
correlated with the underpricing phenomenon, particularly in terms of 
privatization forms. Numerous researchers around the world have come 
out with various results on underpricing. However, all of them agree that 
this matter is remained as a hot issue and require further exploration 
throughout these days. Thus, this research is committed to evaluate 
whether underpricing level of IPOs on privatization is less significant or 
not compared to the one on privately owned enterprises in Indonesia. The 
author would therefore entitle this research as: “Empirical Investigation 
of the Underpricing Phenomenon on IPOs in Privatization of SOEs: 





The pricing valuation of initial public offerings (IPOs) is facing a great 
deal of difficulties ever since there is no observable market price prior to 
the offering made by the company. Ibbotson (1975), as the early writer of 
this phenomenon also has discovered that share price of a going public 
company will jump substantially and tend to be underpriced on the first 
day of trading. Numerous literatures and research also have been showing 
that the average of initial public offering (IPOs) are inclined to be 
underpriced (Alexakis, 2007). He also added details similar to Ibbotson’s 
findings that  short run underpricing phenomenon occurred at the end of 
the first day of trading as the difference between offering price of a stock 
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and its market price.  Ernyan and Husnan (2002) and Desyetti and 
Adriyanto (2004) found the significant result on positive initial return that 
conveyed underpricing in Indonesian Capital market. 
 
Moreover, Underpricing theories are generally derived from asymmetric 
information model, in which considering that one party acquires further 
information than the others. However, many researchers found several 
other driven factors aside from this model in relation with underpricing 
performance, such as winner’s curse hypothesis, signaling theory and 
principal agent theory.However, occurrence of underpricing phenomenon 
is not only around privately-owned enterprises but also taken place within 
the privatization form. Various researchers such as, Huang and Levich, 
(1999), Choi and Nam (1998), Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) and 
Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2000) have examined worldwide 
underpricing phenomenon by comparing these two groups. 
 
In additon, Privatization IPOs (PIPOs) should have encountered less 
business risk and result on less underpricing than private sectors based on 
the traditional theory of asymmetry information which was employed by 
Choi and Nam (1998) and Dewenter and Malatesta (1997). This 
interpretation was also emerged and supported based on the fact that state-
owned enterprises usually run in large scale and well established industry 
with a long track record compared to new or less-known companies in 
private IPOs. The literatures made by Carter, Dark, & Singh (1998) and 
Ritter, (1984, 1991) also exposed that more established firms are bearing 
less threat within the company.  Specifically, SOE is often connected with 
how long the company has been operating and continue to exist to become 
the proficient one in its industry, by maximizing the chance in competitive 
business opportunities that exist in the economy. Moreover, this research 
also in line with the study conducted by Carter, Dark, & Singh (1998), 
Dunbar, (2000), and Jain & Kini, (2000) that the more established firms 
would normally offer larger IPOs and reduces perceived risk of the 
offering price. Beatty and Ritter (1986) also procured that smaller offering 
on average is more speculative with greater uncertainty corresponding to 
larger parts.  
 
The legal proponent of SOEs itself holds ministerial position and 
supported by members of the House of Representatives through the 
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legislation issuance (Law of SOEs No. 19/2003) on June 19, 2003. 
Moreover, the standardize legislation associated with the action of 
Privatization SOEs is also ratified in the Government Decree No. 33/2005, 
in which contained the regulation of all privatized SOEs should be 
competitive in its industry (Chapter 3, article 7 of Government Decree No. 
33/2005). In addition, Prominence SOE is able to diminish the 
intervention of underwriter reputation, as the government enterprise does 
not seek any advantages from it to ensure the quality of the shares and 
reduce the uncertainty level of the shares during privatization occurrences 
(Government Decree no 33/2005 on Chapter 4, part 3, article 13-17). The 
legal regulations also emphasize on the government selection over the 
appropriate underwriter.The cost of privatization itself must serve 
principles of fairness, transparency and accountability, which is set by the 
Minister of SOE (Chapter 4, part 4, article 19 of Government Decree No. 
33/2005). Hence, government as major shareholder will provide better 
guarantees for investors and eliminate the uncertainty about the real value 
of the shares. However, this standard itself did not rule the probability 
occurrence of asymmetric information to induce underpricing level in 





This research will develop the model to examine the initial returns earned 
by investors on the initial public offering within two separated groups of 
the listed companies. It comprises the existence of underpricing 
phenomenon in Indonesian Stock Exchange for both privately owned and 
state-owned groups of enterprises. Prior studies around the world have 
been done to determine the occurrence of underpricing phenomenon 
through findings from Ibbotson (1975), Ritter (1984), Ibbotson, Sindelar 
and Ritter (1988), Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) and Alexakis 
(2007). Their documentation found that the share price of a going public 
company will jump substantially and tend to be underpriced on the first 
day of trading. This phenomenon conformed by Beatty (1989) as a 
realistic transfer of wealth from issuer to the investors, thus the issuers are 
necessary to be cautious in underpricing their offering price.  
Different goals and objectives to benefit oneself from each party involved 
in this going public process promotes every individual to equally take part 
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in contriving the underpricing phenomenon. Furthermore, asymmetric 
information in this situation has aggravated this situation even worse. 
Various capital markets around the world are encountered underpricing 
problems that originated from asymmetry of information as the root of this 
complicated issue and arrive with the implication on issuers, underwriters, 
as well as investors as the related parties. Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist 
(1994) draw a conclusion from all 25 worldwide countries with the 
accessible statistical data are encountered underpricing in the short run. In 
Indonesia itself, Ernyan and Husnan (2002) and Desyetti and Adriyanto 
(2004) found the significant result on positive initial return that conveyed 
underpricing in Indonesian Capital Market.  
 
In evaluation, underlying theory of higher average of initial returns is due 
to the uncertainty of the value of the firm, winner’s curse condition and 
principal-agent cost. This theory is mostly related to asymmetric 
information between related parties, which develop into other relevant 
issues such as principal-agency cost and the attempt of signaling. The 
motive of underpricing on the first place is based on the compensation 
given by issuer on the uncertainty about the value of the offered shares to 
the investors. In addition, this is also accordance with signaling theory 
based on Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Huang (1989) and 
Welch (1989) as useful tool in directly give signal to the potential 
investors. As the firm itself conquers better information of its future 
prospect, only IPOs from good firms can send high-quality signal to 
investors. 
 
Further aspect is involving investment banker as underwriter, which is 
trying to suppress pricing of shares in order to sell all the shares, ever 
since they must buy back the shares if the shares are not sold out (Baron, 
1982). The other substantial reason is also to build a good for reputation 
by sold out or even oversubscribe and provide abnormal returns to 
investors (Beatty and Ritter, 1986).  Lastly, the underlying reason is due to 
the issuers must continue to catch the attention of uninformed as well as 
informed investors to avoid massive adverse selection (Rock, 1986). Thus, 
new issues must be on average underpriced to provide uninformed 
investors with appropriate rates of return and attract more participation 
from them.  
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Despite the causes of underpricing itself, the occurrence of underpricing 
phenomenon is not only around privately-owned enterprises but it also 
taken place within the privatization form. Various researchers such as, 
Huang and Levich (1999), Choi and Nam (1998), Dewenter and Malatesta 
(1997) , and Ljungqvist Jenkinson and Wilhelm, (2000) have examined 
the insight of worldwide underpricing phenomenon by comparing these 
two groups. An auxiliary proposition has arisen on this implication of 
underpricing as various objectives have exceeded the primary advantage 
on the sales price of the current IPO and drive some government to more 
likely underprice its privatization offerings. This proposition is trying to 
discern the significance level of underpricing within the privatization and 
privately owned enterprises. This phenomenon was dominantly support 
with asymmetric information theory. It generally describes that IPO 
underpricing is positively related to uncertainty level on the value of the 
assets. 
 
However, Privatization IPOs (PIPOs) should have encountered less 
business risk and result on less underpricing than private sectors based on 
the traditional theory of asymmetry information which was employed by 
Choi and Nam (1998) , Carter, Dark, & Singh (1998), Ritter (1984,1991) 
and Dewenter and Malatesta (1997). This interpretation was also emerged 
and supported based on the fact that state-owned enterprises usually run in 
large scale and well established industry with a long track record 
compared to new or less-known companies in private IPOs. The 
interconnection between underpricing and privatization can also be 
noticed in Indonesian state-owned enterprises. The preparation of 
privatization program has been set through the ministry of state owned 
enterprises or state owned enterprises agency. Moreover, this research also 
in line with the study conducted by Carter, Dark, & Singh (1998), Dunbar 
(2000), and Jain & Kini, (2000) that the more established firms would 
normally offer larger IPOs and reduces perceived risk of the offering 
price. Beatty and Ritter (1986) also procured that smaller offering on 
average is more speculative with greater uncertainty corresponding to 
larger parts.  
 
Moreover, the standardize legislation of the action of Privatization SOEs 
is ratified in the Government Decree No. 33/2005 and  preserve a tight 
atmosphere in the privatization process, such as all privatized SOEs 
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should be competitive in its industry, which mostly the market leader in its 
industry (Chapter 3, article 7 of Government Decree No. 33/2005) and the 
cost associated with privatization itself must serve the principles of 
fairness, transparency and accountability (Chapter 4, part 4, article 19 of 
Government Decree No. 33/2005).  
 
Moreover, Prominence status of state-owned enterprise is able to diminish 
the intervention of underwriter reputation as the government enterprise 
does not seek any advantage from the underwriter reputation to ensure the 
quality of the shares and reduce the uncertainty level of the shares. In 
addition, the legal regulation of Government Decree No. 33 /2005 on 
Chapter 4, part 3, and article 13-17 also has set certain specification to 
determine the most suitable underwriter to carry out the IPO process and 
the government will have a direct supervision on the performance of the 
underwriter. Thus, the underwriter must also provide the best appraisal for 
the go public SOE to determine the general underpricing level. Hence, the 
government as major shareholder will provide better guarantees for 
investors and eliminate the uncertainty about the real value of the shares. 
Consequently, the hypothesis will be established as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: 
HA1: The initial mean return of privatization of IPOs in Indonesia 
is less compared to the return in private sector IPOs. 
 
 
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Samples Data 
The author uses purposive sampling methods to obtain samples. The total 
population of this study is 425 public listed companies in Indonesian 
Stock Exchange throughout 2011. The author has come to a decision to 
limit the samples of data into 162 newly listed companies from the period 
2000-2009, which comprises both privately and state owned enterprises. 
However, those IPO companies have to meet several requirements to be 
categorized in the final samples, as follows: 
1. Have a complete set of financial data required to estimate Initial 
return at first trading day, Total Assets, OROA, Leverage, 
Retained Ownership and Total Gross Proceed. Hence, 10 
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companies were further eliminated since they do not provide 
complete accessible data to be extracted in this research. 
2. Provide relevant prospectus prior to its IPO process. Thus, 5 IPO 
companies are eliminated due to unavailability of the prospectus 
provided in Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
 As a result those companies will have to be omitted from the research 
sample and leave 147 IPO companies as the final samples. 
 
Data Methodology 
The research presents the result of one sample t-test and the binomial test 
to confirm the occurrence of underpricing level throughout the entire IPO 
companies in Indonesia. Furthermore, this research will also conduct the 
individual test for both groups related with the extent of undepricing.  
Hence, the result observed will be focusing on each group to determine the 
existence of underpricing. The result of one sample t-test and the binomial 
test will confirm the occurrence of underpricing level for each of the IPO 
performed by SOE and Non- SOEs Additionally, the main exploration in 
this study is to investigate the difference of underpricing level among the 
SOEs and Non-SOEs. The hypothesis is to investigate on whether the 
underpricing level of SOEs subsample would be lower than the Non- 
SOEs subsample. To test this possibility, the two subgroups will be 
analyzed by conducting the independent sample t-test and its 
nonparametric corresponding item, the Mann-Whitney U test. The 
approach in this research is using one-tailed test due to the research 
hypothesis is determining on whether the underpricing level of SOEs 
subsample would be lower than the Non- SOEs one, which focus simply 
on one side 
 
Moreover, this research also conduct multiple regression analysis which is  
based on the underpricing level as the dependent variable and affected by 
the main dummy variable which defines the IPOs of privatization with 1 
and 0 for otherwise. There are also control variables including, Age, Gross 
Proceeds, OROA, Retained Ownership, and Leverage. Research model 
given below is to test the first hypothesis determined earlier by means of 
purpose to find the correlation between the degree of underpricing and all 
related independent variables on all IPOs that went public from 2000 to 
2009. The author would examine the firm year observation of 
underpricing level for both state-owned and privately owned enterprises 
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listed in the IDX using the multiple regression equation. In addition, the 
result from adjusted R-square would facilitate in gaining better insight 
about the model.  
Model: 
 
 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊ ௜݃௧ ൌ  ߚ ൅  ߚଵ ሺܦܷ_ܱܵܧ ሻ௜௧   ൅    ߚଶ ሺܣ݃݁ሻ௜௧   
൅   ߚଷሺܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏሻ௜௧  ൅   ߚସሺܱܴܱܣሻ௜௧   ൅    ߚହሺܴ݁ݐ݋ݓ݊ሻ௜௧  
൅  ߚ଺ሺܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁ሻ௜௧   ൅ ߝ௜௧  
Given:  
Underpricing it  = Undepricing returns of the IPO firm i that went 
public at year t. 
ߚଵ DU_SOE it   = Dummy variables which equal to the value of 1 if 
the IPOs are from state-owned enterprises 
(privatization) and 0 if otherwise. 
 ߚଶ Age it = Company age of firm i at year t. 
ߚଷ Gross Proceeds it = Number of the offering shares multiplies by the 
offering price of company i at year t. 
ߚସ OROA it = Operating returns on assets of company i at year t. 
ߚହ RetOwn it  = Percentage of shares owned by the SOEs and non 
SOEs at the year of issuing. 
ߚ଺ Leverage it  = Debt ratio of company i at year t. 
εit =    Error Term 
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FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION  
 
The research presents the result of one sample t-test and the binomial test 
to confirm the occurrence of underpricing level throughout the entire IPO 
companies in Indonesia.  
 
Table 1. Test for the Extent of Underpricing from Total Samples 
 
 
N = 147 IPO firms 
Initial Return 
(IR) 
    
Mean 0.440646143 
Median 0.225045 
Standard Deviation 0.798978024 
One sample t-statistics 6.687 
p-value for one tailed t-test 0.000 
p-value for one tailed Binomial test 0.000 
 
Furthermore, the result from binomial test is proven to be strongly 
significant as the p-value result is less than 1% significant level. In 
addition, the result for one sample t-test also has the p-value less than 1% 
significant level.  Thus, there is an indication that IPOs performed by both 
SOEs and Non-SOEs will experience underpricing at the first trading day. 
The result is now valid as the general information since it has proven 
through the statistical tests.  
Furthermore, this research will also conduct the individual test for both 
groups related with the extent of undepricing.  Hence, the result observed 
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Table 2. Individual Test for Underpricing of SOE and Non-SOE 
 
N = 147 IPO firms Initial Return (IR) 
  SOE   
Non-
SOE 
Mean 0.050195321  0.469146 
Median 0.125  0.26087 
Standard Deviation 0.32190939  0.816345 
t-statistics 0.493093852  6.726587 
p-value for one tailed t-test 0.316876739  0.0000 
p-value for one tailed Binomial 
test 0.0546875  0.0000 
 
Table 2 in the above presents the result of one sample t-test and the 
binomial test to confirm the occurrence of underpricing level for each of 
the IPO performed by SOE and Non- SOEs. The p-value of SOE by using 
binomial test is significant under the 10% significant level with the value 
of 5.46%. Additionally, the p-value result of Non-SOE by using the same 
method has also produced the p-value of lower than 1% significant level. 
Thus, the result of the p-value for Non-SOE is in conformity with the 
result for SOE and depicted the presence of underpricing in both groups. 
In conclusion, individual tests for both groups are supporting the notion 
that there is underpricing phenomenon among those two groups, as the 
research will rely more on the result of non-parametric test rather than the 
parametric test.  
Additionally, the main exploration in this study is to investigate the 
difference of underpricing level among the SOEs and Non-SOEs. The 
hypothesis is to investigate on whether the underpricing level of SOEs 
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Table 3. Comparison Test for Underpricing level between SOE and Non-
SOE 
 
N = 147 IPO firms Initial Return (IR) 
Mean 0.050195321  0.469146 
Median 0.125  0.26087 
Standard Deviation 0.32190939  0.816345 
2-independent sample t-statistics -1.6090 
(1 tailed p-value)  0.055 
Mann-Whitney U statistics  -1.820 
(1 tailed p-value)  0.0345 
 
Furthermore, the first test was assessed by using the Mann-Whitney U test 
and produces the p-value of 3.45%, which is less than 5% significant 
level. Thus, the null hypothesis can be rejected as the result is significant 
to validate the alternative hypothesis. In addition, the result is also 
strengthened by the result of the parametric test which also has the p-value 
lower than the conventional levels with the value of 5.5%. Although the 
parametric test is only an ancillary test for this research, however the 
result produced is still in line with the result from Mann-Whitey U test. 
Thus, the null hypothesis that the degree of underpricing on SOEs is not 
less than that of Non-SOEs can be rejected, as the p-value is lower than 
the conventional level. The statistical outcome has clearly reinforced the 
fact that the observed initial return on SOE is less underpriced than Non-
SOEs. The aforementioned result of this research has authenticated the 
evidence of less underpricing amidst in the SOEs. More importantly, the 
null hypothesis for both subsamples was rejected by using independent 
sample t-test and its nonparametric corresponding item, the Mann-
Whitney U test. 
 
These findings corresponded with findings from Athens exchange by 
Alexakis (2007) but opposed to Samarakoon (2010) and Ljungqvist, 
Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2000)’findings. The results from this study also 
provide response regarding the argument by Dewenter and Malatesta 
(1997) and Huang and Levich (1999) which cannot reveal any tendency 
that privatization is more underpriced than private sectors and they come 
up with inconclusive opinion. Thus, the findings will be supporting the 
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prior research as underpricing in privatization was varies within counties. 
Therefore, the notion of higher underpricing within the IPO performed by 
the SOE in Indonesia is not supported by the data in Indonesia.  
The Privatization IPOs (PIPOs) is believed to be encountered less business 
risk and result on less underpricing than private sectors based on the 
traditional theory of asymmetry information which was employed by Choi 
and Nam (1998) and Dewenter and Malatesta (1997). This interpretation 
was supported based on the fact that SOEs usually run in large scale and 
well established industry with a long track record compared to new or 
less-known companies in private IPOs. The literatures made by Carter, 
Dark, & Singh (1998) and Ritter (1984, 1991) also elucidated that more 
established firms are bearing less threat within the company.   
 
Moreover, this research also in line with the study conducted by Carter, 
Dark, & Singh (1998), Dunbar (2000), and Jain & Kini, (2000) that the 
more established firms would normally offer larger IPOs and reduces 
perceived risk of the offering price. Thus, the underpricing within the 
SOEs can be minimized ever since the social status of the company itself 
has diminished the asymmetric information that lies within. Additionally, 
the preparation of privatization program has been strictly set under the 
ministry of state owned enterprises agency in Indonesia at the first place. 
The legal proponent of SOEs itself holds ministerial position and 
supported by members of the House of Representatives through the 
legislation issuance (Law of SOEs No. 19/2003) on June 19, 2003.  
 
Moreover, the standardize legislation associated with the action of 
Privatization SOEs is also ratified in the Government Decree No. 33/2005, 
in which contained the regulation of all privatized SOEs should be 
competitive in its industry (Chapter 3, article 7 of Government Decree No. 
33/2005). Furthermore, the cost of privatization itself must serve 
principles of fairness, transparency and accountability, which is set by the 
Minister of SOE (Chapter 4, part4, article 19 of Government Decree No. 
33/2005). Thus, the costs for conduct the IPO will not be exaggerate and 
build upon the appropriate estimation on government’s budget.  
 
However, the purpose of underwriter in privatization IPO is dissimilar 
with the purpose of the private issuers that will utilize reputable 
underwriter to ensures the quality of the offered shares and reduce the 
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uncertainty level. The prominence state-owned enterprise is able to 
diminish the intervention of underwriter reputation, as government 
enterprise does not seek any advantage from the underwriter reputation. 
Thus, the purpose of underwriter within the privatization IPO is merely 
administers the public issuance and distribution of securities to the 
investors.  
 
Moreover, the legal regulation also emphasizes and holds the control over 
the tight screening over the appropriate underwriter for the privatization 
occurrences (Chapter 4, part 3, article 13-17of Government Decree No. 
33/2005). As a result, the chosen investment banker cannot manipulate 
and suppress pricing of the share in order to minimize the selling effort as 
well as diminish the probability to buy back all the unsold shares.  Thus, 
the investment banker will have to deal with the most appropriate 
valuation on the shares offered to the public, result in lower underpricing 
compared to the private sectors. 
 
The primary aim of privatization process itself is also influencing the 
degree of underpricing throughout the IPO.  Primarily privatization in 
Indonesia was driven as to deal with the budget deficit build upon the 
findings from Irianto (2004). However, a comprehensive privatization 
program of SOEs was clearly commenced in the aftermath of the East 
Asian Financial Crisis. Nevertheless, the tendency of selling the 
government stake in the SOEs was pondered as a viable choice and likely 
considered as the coincident effort to pursue. Since that major crisis, 
Indonesia is still experiencing the budget deficit until now. Even though 
the deficit is not as severe as the prior era, but the existence of budget 
deficit is still haunting the Indonesian government. Thus, the government 
needs to finance the budget deficit by using the fund raised from the 
privatization of IPO and this underlying reason in some way will diminish 
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Table 4. Multiple Regression Analysis 
           
Dependent Variable : Initial return 
Independent 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic p-value 
Predicted 
sign 
            
           
Constant 4.17234 1.077166 3.873443 0.0002  
DSOE -0.059891 0.129157 -0.46371 0.6436 (-) 
Leverage -0.024738 0.262491 -0.09424 0.9251 (+) 
 Age -0.109844 0.093482 -1.17503 0.242 (-) 
Gross Proceed -0.121994 0.030384 -4.01507 0.0001 (-) 
OROA 0.251762 0.203018 1.240097 0.217 (-) 
RetOwn -0.509435 0.504489 -1.0098 0.3143 (-) 
           
           
R-squared 0.100455        
Adjusted R-squared 0.061903        
F-statistic 2.605714        
Prob(F-statistic) 0.020023        
            
 
DSOE= a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if IPO company is classified 
as SOE and zero otherwise. Leverage = a control variable that represents the debt 
ratio of IPO company one year prior to IPO process. Age = a control variable that 
represents the natural log from the total number of years between the company’s 
date of incorporation and the date of their IPOs. Gross Proceed= a control 
variable that represents the natural log of total amount acquired during the IPO. 
OROA= a control variable that represents by dividing a company's annual 
operating income with average total asset of last fiscal year prior to the IPO year 
and the second-to-last fiscal year prior to the IPO. Retained Ownership = a 
control variable that is represented by the portion of shares held by the company. 
 
Multiple regressions is conducted to determine more comprehensive 
outcome about techniques for modeling and analyzing several variables, 
when the focus is on the relationship between a dependent variable and 
one or more independent variables. The magnitude of the relationship 
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among the variables has the value of R-squared and adjusted R-squared 
for 10.04% and 6.19%, respectively. Those values are categorized to be 
relatively weak for cross sectional analysis. The evaluation shows that 
quite various unexplainable dependent variable by the independent 
variable.  It can be estimated that only 6.19% of dependent variable can be 
explained by the independent variables, and left 93.81% of it to be 
remained unexplainable due to the presence of omitted variables that are 
not used in this research. 
 
The main independent variable as represent by the dummy variable of 
SOEs has the same actual direction of coefficient as the prior predicted 
sign, thus it should be halved and become 32.18%. However, the p-value 
falls above the conventional level and shows that the independent variable 
is not significant to influence the first day initial return as the dependent 
variable. Therefore, the nature of the ownership has not shown that the go 
public SOEs is offering lower initial return compared to the Non-SOEs. 
This result shows that the underpricing among SOEs and Non-SOEs is 
similar one to another.The result of multiple regression analysis produces 
the outcome of main independent variable of dummy SOE to be 
insignificant to explain the extent of underpricing. The other control 
variables are utilized to obtain a comprehensive result from this reaearch. 
Therefore, the focus of this test is relying on the nature of SOE itself 
which correspond to the main dummy SOE. In the end, the nature of SOE 
does not exactly experience lower underpricing compared to the Non-
SOE. This shows that the result of underpricing among SOE and Non-
SOE to be similar one to another. This finding can be interpreted as the 
anomaly of underpricing is generally the same for both SOE and Non-
SOE within the business society in Indonesia within the last 10 years 
period. 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
Conclusion  
Underpricing phenomenon has been one of the most complex anomalies 
during the process of go public process. Prior studies around the world 
have been done to determine the occurrence of underpricing phenomenon 
through findings from Ibbotson (1975), Ritter (1984), Ibbotson, Sindelar 
and Ritter (1988) and Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) and Alexakis 
(2007) .Their documentations found that the share price of a going public 
company will jump substantially and tend to be underpriced on the first 
day of trading. This phenomenon conformed by Beatty (1989) as a 
realistic transfer of wealth from issuer to the investors, thus the issuers are 
necessary to be cautious in underpricing their offering price.  
Seeing that the extent of IPO has been covering both privately and state-
owned enterprises, thus many possibilities have arisen from the action that 
has been made by these major participants of the IPOs. One of the 
significant question marks that left behind within business society is 
correlated with underpricing phenomenon particularly in terms of 
privatization forms. Thus this research is committed to make some 
estimation on whether underpricing level of IPOs on privatization is less 
significant or not compared to the one on privately owned enterprises in 
Indonesia. 
The main purpose of this study is to answer the research question. By the 
end of the research, the following answer to research question is 
discovered: 
 
1. Does the underpricing extent in Indonesian listed companies is lower 
within the SOE compared to the Non-SOE? 
The Indonesian companies that conducted IPO during the period of 2000 
to 2009 found that the initial return of first trading day by the SOE is 
generally less underpriced than the private sectors based on univariate test 
that have been conducted.  This action is made possible by the supportive 
evidence surrounds the atmosphere of SOE itself.  Several facts and 
evidences are supporting the notion of less asymmetric information among 
the SOE. 
Firstly, the Privatization IPOs (PIPOs) will encounter less business risk 
and result on less underpricing than private sectors as based on the 
traditional theory of asymmetry information which was employed by Choi 
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and Nam (1998) , Carter, Dark, & Singh, (1998), Ritter (1984, 1991) and 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997). This interpretation was supported based 
on the fact that state-owned enterprises usually run in large scale and well 
established industry with a long track record compared to new or less-
known companies in private IPOs.   
 
Secondly, the preparation of privatization program has been strictly set 
under the ministry of state owned enterprises agency in Indonesia at the 
first place. The ministry of state-owned enterprises or state-owned 
enterprises agency in Indonesia was a new development to bear 
responsibility in the supervision and development of SOEs. The legal 
proponent of SOEs itself holds ministerial position and supported by 
members of the House of Representatives through the legislation issuance 
(Law of SOEs No. 19/2003) on June 19, 2003. Moreover, the standardize 
legislation associated with the action of Privatization SOEs is also ratified 
in the Government Decree No. 33/2005, in which contained the regulation 
of all privatized SOEs should be competitive in its industry (Chapter 3, 
article 7 of Government Decree No. 33/2005). The cost of privatization 
itself must serve principles of fairness, transparency and accountability, 
which is set by the Minister of SOE (Chapter 4, part4, article 19 of 
Government Decree No. 33/2005).  
 
Thirdly, the prominence state-owned enterprise is able to diminish the 
intervention of underwriter reputation, as government enterprise does not 
seek any advantage from the underwriter reputation. Thus, the purpose of 
underwriter within the privatization IPO is merely administers the public 
issuance and distribution of securities to the investors. Moreover, the legal 
regulation also emphasizes and holds the control over the tight screening 
over the appropriate underwriter for the privatization occurrences (Chapter 
4, part 3, article 13-17of Government Decree No. 33/2005).  
 
Lastly, the primary aim of privatization process itself is also influencing 
the degree of underpricing throughout the IPO. Thus, the government 
needs to finance the budget deficit by using the fund raised from the 
privatization of IPO and this underlying reason in some way will facilitate 
to diminish the degree of underpricing. 
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However, all of the supportive evidence from the univariate test does not 
totally applicable for the multivariate analysis, which is conducted by 
using multiple regression analysis. The result of multiple regression 
analysis was in contrary with the univariate test as the outcome has proven 
that the nature of SOE does not exactly experience lower underpricing 
compared to the Non-SOE. This shows that the result of underpricing 
among SOE and Non-SOE to be similar one to another. The finding can be 
interpreted as the anomaly of underpricing is generally the same for both 
SOE and Non-SOE within the business society in Indonesia within the last 
10 years period.  
 
Recommendation  
Based on the findings of the research, the author would like to address 
some useful recommendations, as follows: 
• The findings from the research can give contributions for the future 
management of the companies which plan to carry out the IPO 
process. Management team will be more vigilant in doing the 
appraisal for the underpricing level, since lower underpricing is 
perceived to be better as it bear lower risk of the company.  Thus, 
potential companies which will go public should be the one with 
the well-established with advance performance, which will 
inherent lower risk on the first place, just like the SOEs in this 
study. 
 
• SOEs in this study are dominant firms in their respective industries 
and proven to have less underpricing during IPO.  Meanwhile, 
other smaller companies which also have intention to go public 
should prepare their company’s performance to be able to compete 
with the large scale companies in the market. To compensate for 
size disadvantage, smaller company should exhibit a high 
performance company, otherwise steep underpricing or failure in 












Abeng, T. (2001). Indonesia, Inc: privatising state-owned enterprises. 
California: Times Academic. 
 
Aktan, C. C. (1995). An Introduction to the theory privatization. The 
Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies , 20(2), 187-
215. 
 
Alexakis, P. (2007). Are Share Issue Privatisations Fairly Priced? 
European Journal of Economis, Finance and Administrative 
Sciences, 60-68. 
 
Allen, F., & Faulhaber, G. R. (1989). Signaling by underpricing in the 
IPO market. Journal of Financial Economics , 23(2), 303-323. 
 
Arthurs, J. D., Hoskisson, R. E., Busenitz, L. W., & Jhonson, R. A. 
(2008). Managerial agents watching other Agents: Multiple 
agency conflicts regarding underpricing in IPO firms. Academy 
of Management Journal, 51(2), 277-294. 
 
Astami, E. W., Tower, G., Rusmin, R., & Neilson, J. (2010). The effect 
of privatisation on performance of state-owned-enterprises in 
Indonesia. Asian Review of Accounting, 18 (1), 5-19. 
 
Aussenegg, W. (2000). Privatization versus Private Sector Initial Public 
Offerings in Poland. Multinational Finance Journal, 4(1-2), 69-
99. 
 
Baker, H. K., & Powell, G. (2005). Understanding Financial 
Management: A Practical Guide. Malden: Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd. 
 
Barber, B. M., & Lyon, J. D. (1996). Detecting abnormal operating 
performance: the empirical power and specification of test 
statistics. Journal of Financial Economics , 41(3), 359–399. 
 
Setiobudi, M., et al / Journal of Applied Finance and Accounting 3(2) 109-135 
 
130) 
Baron, D. P. (1982). A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking 
Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues. The Journal 
of Finance, 37(4), 955-976. 
 
Bauwhede, H. V. (2009). On the relation between corporate governance 
compliance and operating performance. Accounting and 
Business ResearcH, 39(5), 497–513. 
 
Beatty, R. P. (1989). Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial Public 
Offerings. The Accounting Review, 64(4), 693-709. 
 
Beatty, R. P., & Ritter, J. R. (1986). Investment banking, reputation, and 
the underpricing of initial public offerings. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 15(1-2), 213-232. 
 
Bel, G. (2002). Privatization: public offerings and political objectives. 
Applied Economics, 34(11), 1421-1432. 
 
Boardman, A. E., & Vining, A. R. (1989). Ownership and Performance 
in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the 
Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises. 
Journal of Law & Economics, 32, 1-33. 
 
Carter, R., Dark, F., & Singh, A. (1998). Underwriter reputation, initial 
returns, and the long-run performance of IPO stocks. Journal of 
Finance, 53, 285–311. 
 
Chang, X., Gygax, A. F., Oon, E., & Zhang, H. F. (2008). Audit quality, 
auditor compensation and initial public offering underpricing. 
Accounting and Finance , 48(3), 391-416. 
 
Choi, S. D., & Nam, S. K. (1998). The Short-Run Performance of IPOs 
of Privately- and Publicly-Owned Firms: International 
Evidence. Multinational Finance Journal , 2(3), 225-244. 
 
Chowdhry, B., & Sherman, A. (1996). The winner’s curse and 
international methods of allocating initial public offerings. 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal , 4(1), 15-30. 
 
 




Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., & Rusticus, T. (2006). Does weak governance 
cause weak stock returns? An examination of firm operating 
performance and investors’ expectations. Journal of Finance, 
61(2), 655–687. 
 
Desyetti, D., Adrianto, F., & Rivai, D. (2004). Analisis fenomena 
underpricing di pasar modal Indonesia. Project Report. 
Lembaga Penelitian Universitas Andalas . 
 
Dewenter, K. L., & Malatesta, P. H. (1997). Public Offerings of State-
Owned and Privately-Owned Enterprises: An International 
Comparison. The Journal of Finance, 52(4), 1659-1679. 
 
Downes, J., & Goodman, J. E. (2003). Barron's Finance & Investment 
Handbook (6th ed.). Hauppauge: Barron's Educational Series, 
Inc. 
 
Dunbar, C. (2000). Factors affecting investment bank initial public 
offering market share. Journal of Financial Economics, 55, 3–
41. 
 
Ernyan, & Husnan, S. (2002). Perbandingan Underpricing Penerbitan 
Saham Perdana Perusahaan Keuangan dan Non Keuangan di 
Pasar Modal Indonesia: Pengujian Hipotesis Asimetri Informasi. 
Jurnal Ekonomi dan bisnis Indonesia, 17. 
 
Fama, E. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of 
Political Economy, 288-307. 
 
Gan, J. (2009). Privatization in China : Experiences and Lessons. In J. R. 
Barth, J. A. Tatom, & G. Yago, China's Emerging Financial 
Markets: Challenges and Opportunities. New York: Springer. 
 
Geddes, R. (2003). IPOs and Equity Offerings. Burlington: Butterworth-
Heinemann. 
 
Setiobudi, M., et al / Journal of Applied Finance and Accounting 3(2) 109-135 
 
132) 
Ghozali, I., & Mansyur, M. a. (2002). Analisis Faktor-Faktor yang 
Mempengaruhi Tingkat Underpricing Di Bursa Efek Jakarta. 
Jurnal Bisnis dan Akuntansi , 4. 
 
Grinblatt, M., & Huang, C. Y. (1989). Signalling and the Pricing of New 
Issues. The Journal of Finance , 44 (2), 393-420. 
 
Hardiningsih, P., Suryanto, L., & Chariri, A. (2002). Pengaruh Faktor 
Fundamental dan Resiko Ekonomi terhadap Return Saham pada 
Perusahaan di bursa Efek Jakarta. Jurnal Strategi dan Bisnis , 8. 
 
Haskel, J., & Szymansky, S. (1994). Privatization and the Labour Market 
: Facts, Theory , and Evidence. In M. Bishop, J. Kay, & C. P. 
Mayer, Privatization and economic performance. New York: 
Oxford University Press, Inc. 
 
Hill, H. (2000). The Indonesian Economy (2 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Huang, Q., & Levich, R. M. (1999). Underpricing of new equity 
offerings by privatized firms: An international Test. 
International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance , 6 
(1), 1-30. 
 
Ibbotson, R. G. (1975). Price performance of common stock new issues. 
Journal of Financial Economics , 2 (3), 235-272. 
 
Ibbotson, R., Sindelar, J., & Ritter, J. (1988). Initial public offerings. 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance , 1, 37-45. 
 
Irianto, G. (2004). A critical enquiry into privatization of state-owned 
enterprise: the case of PT Semen Gresik (Persero) TBK. 
Indonesia. University of Wollongong Thesis Collection . 
 
Jain, B., & Kini, O. (1999a). The life cycle of initial public offering 





Setiobudi, M., et al / Journal of Applied Finance and Accounting 3(2) 109-135 
 
(133
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial 
behavior, agency cost, and ownership structure. Journal of 
Financial Economics , 3, 305-360. 
 
Jones, S. L., Megginson, W. L., Nash, R. C., & Netter, J. M. (1999). 
Share issue privatizations as financial means to political and 
economic ends. Journal of Financial Economics , 53 (2), 217-
253. 
 
Larcker, D., Richardson, S. A., & Tuna, I. (2005). Ratings add fire to the 
governance debate. Financial Times Mastering Corporate 
Governance Part Two.  
 
Lieberman, I. W., & Rahuja, S. (1995). An overview of Privatization in 
Russia. In I. W. Lieberman, J. Nellis, E. Karlova, J. Mukherjee, 
& S. Rahuja, Russia: creating private enterprises and efficient 
markets. Washington: World Bank Publications. 
 
Ljungqvist, A. (2006). IPO Underpricing. working paper, NYU, Stern 
School of Business . 
 
Ljungqvist, A. P., Jenkinson, T., & Wilhelm, W. J. (2000). Has the 
introduction of bookbuilding increased the efficiency of 
international IPOs? working paper, NYU, Stern School of 
Business . 
 
Loughran, T., Ritter, J. R., & Rydqvist, K. (1994). Initial public 
offerings: International insights. Pacific Basin Finance Journal , 
2 (2-3), 165-199. 
 
Megawati, W. (2010). Krakatau Steel faces probe over alleged IPO 
‘irregularities’. Metal Bulletin Daily , 240, 292-292. 
 
Muscarella, C. J., & Vetsuypens, M. R. (1987). A simple test of Baron's 
model of IPO underpricing. Journal of Financial Economics , 
24 (1), 125-135. 
 
Setiobudi, M., et al / Journal of Applied Finance and Accounting 3(2) 109-135 
 
134) 
Netter, J. M., & Megginson, W. L. (2001). From State to Market: A 
Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization. Journal of 
Economic Literature , 39 (2), 321-389. 
 
Perotti, E. C. (1995). Credible Privatization. The American Economic 
Review , 85 (4), 847-859. 
 
Ramamurti, R. (1992). Why are developing countries privatizing? 
Journal of International Business Studies , 23 (2), 225-249. 
 
Ritter, J. R. (1998). Initial Public Offerings. Contemporary Finance 
Digest , 2, 5-30. 
 
Ritter, J. (1984). The hot issue market of 1980. Journal of Business , 57, 
215–240. 
 
Ritter, J. (1991). The long-run performance of initial public offerings. 
Journal of Finance , 46, 3–27. 
 
Rock, K. (1986). Why new issues are underpriced. Journal of Financial 
Economics , 15 (1-2), 187-212. 
 
Rodoni, A. (2002). Penawaran Saham Perdana: Pengalaman di Bursa 
Efek Jakarta 1990 - 1998. Simposium Nasional Keuangan, In 
Memoriam Prof. Bambang Riyanto , 17 (4). 
 
Rondinelli, D. A. (1995). Privatization and economic transformation : 
the management challenge. In J. Prokopenko, Management for 
privatization: Lessons from industry and public service. 
Geneva: International Labour Office. 
 
Samarakoon, L. P. (2010). The Short-Run Underpricing of Initial Public 
Offerings in the Sri Lankan Stock Market. Journal of 
Multinational Finance Management , 20, 197-213. 
 
Seidenstat, P. (1999). Theory and Practice of Contracting Out in the 
United States. In P. Seidenstat, Contracting Out Government 
Services. Westport: Praeger Publishers. 
 
 




Sekaran, U. (2003). Research Methods for Business : A skill Building 
Approach. United States of America: John Wiley & Sons , Inc. 
 
Sherman, A. J. (2005). Preparing for an Initial Public Offering. In 
Raising Capital (2 ed., pp. 197-226). Broadway, NY: 
AMACOM. 
 
Sikorski, D. (1989). The Perspective for Privatization in Singapore. 
Asian Journal of Public Administration , 11 (1), 74-91. 
 
Welch, I. (1989). Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the 
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings. The Journal of Finance 
, 44 (2), 421-449. 
 
 
